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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the Frank decision its use can be expected to increase considerably in the
future. Although this procedure is available to meet community health and
safety problems, care must be taken in drafting authorizing legislation so
as not to encroach unreasonably on the individual's right of privacy. Though
some general guides have been noted and suggested, the allowable limits of
such legislation is still a matter of conjecture.
CHARLES F. ANGEL
THEODORE CORONTZOS
THE GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The only safe generalization which can be made as to the re-
quirements of good-faith bargaining is that it is risky to general-
ize. The courts and the Board have made it abundantly clear that
the determination of whether there has been compliance with the
obligation to bargain in good faith, depends ultimately on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case.'
ORIGIN OF THE REQUIREMENT- THE WAGNER ACT
In section 8(5) of the Wagner (National Labor Relations) Act Con-
gress imposed the duty upon employers covered by the law to bargain col-
lectively with the lawful representatives of their employees.! The Act did
not define "collectively bargaining" but left it up to the National Labor
Relations Board, which the Act had created, to work this out within the
broad scope of the agency's authority to carry out the policies of the Act.
It became obvious to the Board at an early date that the goal of industrial
peace would be frustrated if the obligation of bargaining collectively could
be satisfied by the employer coming to the bargaining table and only going
through the motions without any intention of reaching an agreement. To
overcome this obstacle the Board introduced the requirement of good faith.
The duty to bargain collectively, which the Act imposes upon em-
ployers . . . is not limited to the recognition of employees' repre-
sentatives qua representatives, or to a meeting and discussion of
terms with them. The duty encompasses an obligation to enter into
discussion and negotiation with an open and fair mind and with a
sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement concerning the issues
presented. . ..
This statutory interpretation by the Board of the meaning of the duty
'McLean.Arkansas Lumber Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1036-37 (1954).
249 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
3Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1248 (1939), enforced, 110 F.2d 632
(4th Cir. 1940). See also 84 N.L.R.B 744 (1949), enforcement denied, 184 F.2d
98 (4th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 322 (1951).
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to bargain collectively was fully endorsed by the courts. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said:'
The statute requires of the employer that he bargain collectively
and whether he does so depends upon the character of his acts of
commission or omission .... [T]he trier of facts must determine
whether the acts proved were rendered in good faith.... We think
the Board had full authority to determine as a fact whether peti-
tioner (employer) . .. had actually the intent to bargain, sincerely
and earnestly,-whether the negotiations were captious and accom-
panied by an active purpose and intent to defeat or obstruct real
bargaining.
Thus in the earliest years of the Wagner Act the Board and the courts
arrived at the "good faith" requirement as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion and worked out a broad definition of its meaning. As early as 1939
the good faith requirement was simply defined as requiring that the em-
ployer "enter into the discussion with a fair and open mind, and sincere
purpose to find a basis of agreement. "'
Growth of the Doctrine by Application
An examination of the cases decided on the basis of the good faith re-
quirement in the years prior to 1947 reveals a gradual development of the
good faith requirement through its application to concrete situations pre-
sented to the Board. Good faith is negatived when 'the employer: declines
to sign the agreement entered into ;' grants unilateral wage increases during
the negotiations;' refuses to examine the employees' proposals or to justi-
fy management's opposition ;8 fails to meet with the union within a reason-
able time and at a suitable and convenient place ;9 does not give his nego-
tiators sufficient authority to reach an agreement,' deliberately delays the
negotiations and is unwilling to actively enter into the discussion ;' exerts
pressure in the discussions in the form of threats or reprisals;" refuses to
offer counter proposals when requested to do so or refuses to include a
clause recognizing the union;' insists that the union sign the agreement as
a group of employees rather than as a union." This list is intended to be
neither exhaustive nor typical. It serves rather to illustrate the Board's
and the courts' over-all approach to the problem during the period prior
to 1947. The problems were solved not according to any well defined rules
'Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 133-34 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 595 (1941).
5Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).6H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
'NLRB v. Barret Co., 135 F.2d 959 ((7th Cir. 1943).
'NLRB v. Geo. P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941).9NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 117 F.2d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other ground8,
314 U.S. 512 (1942).
"Republican Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 73 N.L.R.B. 1085 (1947), enforced, 174 F.2d
474 (1st Cir. 1949), adjudication in contempt, 180 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1950).
nNLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
"Supra note 5.
'2McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 565 (1941).
"'Louisville Refining Co. v. NLRB, 102 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 568 (1939).
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but by the pragmatic case by case approach, the Board and the courts ap-
plying the above mentioned definition of "good faith" to the totality of
the employer's conduct in each particular alleged violation.'
The Board and the courts in this period were not concerned solely with
the indicia of employers' bad faith. They were also guided by general con-
siderations which tended to indicate whether or not the employer had
abided by the spirit of the Act. As one author has noted, a willingness to
dispuss all the matters properly within the scope of collective bargaining
and a willingness to change positions and modify demands were most often
considered in determining whether there had been good faith bargaining."
Though there may have been some sacrifice of the employer's freedom
to exact the best terms possible, it must be remembered that the Board was
obligated to effectuate, as a matter of policy, the all-important step toward
the goal of industrial peace-union recognition. Consequently, the Board
saw good faith bargaining in its relationship to this end. It is not sur-
prising to find as a unifying factor in variegated factual situations the
Board's search for "an attitude which showed recognition of the union as
an equal contracting partner with whom the employer is not only willing
to reach an agreement but desirous of doing so. ' "'
It has been further suggested that the good faith requirement was
forged by the Board as a handy tool to prevent management from strangling
incipient unionism by giving it the run-around, and also as a weapon to
compel employers to take the new unions seriously.'
Duty of Union to Bargain in Good Faith
Since the Act made it unlawful only for the employer "to refuse to
bargain collectively ' the cases did not deal with the question whether the
union was acting in good faith. Even though there is dictum in the Globe
Cotton Mills case to the effect that both parties must fulfill the good
faith requirement, it was pretty much assumed that the whole purpose of
the union's existence was to bring about collective bargaining on behalf
of its representatives; consequently it was presumed to act in good faith.
However, the union could by its actions place itself beyond the pale of the
good faith standard by violating its contractual agreement with the em-
ployer."' In the Times Publishing case' the union submitted a complete
contract and refused to discuss its terms on the ground that this was for-
bidden by its constitution. The Board held that the refusal of the em-
ployees to bargain in good faith served to cancel out this obligation on the
part of the employer. Where the union had submitted proposals that were
not required by the Act and had rejected a bonafide counter proposal by
"
5Times Publishing Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 676 (1947).
'
8Comment, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1224 (1948).
'
TId. at 1225.
'GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 401 (2d ed. 1958).
1947 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (5) (1952).
'Supra note 5.
nNLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
'Supra note 15.
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the company, there was a similar ruling.' While the refusal of the com-
pany to furnish the union with information relating to the provisions
covered in the bargaining agreement was ordinarily some proof of lack of
good faith by the employer," the Board refused to find an absence of
good faith when there was no evidence adduced to show that the negotia-
tions between the company and the union were in any manner impeded by
the company's failure to furnish this data. However, the Supreme Court
later vacated this latter decision.w
CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
The passage of the Taft-Hartley (Labor Management Relations) Act
in 1947 provided a statutory basis for the good faith requirement and im-
posed the obligation to bargain in good faith on the employee as well as
the employer." This Act declared in section 8(b) (3): "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to refuse to
bargain collectively with an employer ... ." The new law then proceeds to
define collective bargaining in section 8(d) and imposes on both empolyer
and the representatives of the employees the obligation to "meet at a
reasonable time and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment.'
'
2
Both of these important changes made it clear that Congress had not
only approved the judicial interpretation of making good faith a regular
and integral part of collective bargaining, but also revealed the importance
which Congress attached to this concept in using it to overcome the one-
sidedness that had developed under the Wagner Act. In the light of this
congressional approbation, the case history of the good faith requirement
serves a two-fold function under the Taft-Hartley Act: First, the stand-
ards and tests used by the court and the Board in dealing with the em-
ployer are to continue to have application for management under the new
legislation.; and second, as Congress indicated when it adopted section
8(b) (3), the Board will be guided by its past decisions in judging labor's
fulfillment of this newly imposed duty.' The Board lost no time in point-
ing out that the requirement of section 8(b) would be similar to those set
forth in its own decisions and those of the courts before the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act.'
Two other important changes which relate to good faith should be
noted. The first pertains to the freedom of the parties. Senator Walsh
'NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 128 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 676 (1942).
'Sherwin-Williams Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 651 (1941), enforcement granted per curiam, 130
F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 837 (1936) ; J. H. Al-
lison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946), enforcement granted, 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).
"Pool Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 540 (1946), vacated, 339 U.S. 577 (1960).
"61 Stat. 136, 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
271947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1135. The legislative history of the Act indi-
cates that it was intended to paraphrase the courts' and the Board's decisions.
"CoNF. Rup. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947).
"National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforcement granted, 175 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950).
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had explained in the congressional debate on the Wagner Act that there
would be no compulsion to force labor and management to come to an
agreement: " [It is] the very essence of collective bargaining that either
party shall be free to withdraw if its conditions [are] not met." '  This
same thought was repeated by the court in the Jones & Laughlin case
where it pointed out that the act does not compel any agreement what-
ever.' Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act incorporates this limitation
into the statute by stating that the parties shall neither be compelled to
agree to a proposal nor to make a concession.
The other change is indirect and not so important. It touches on the
freedom of speech doctrine. One of the indicia of bad faith on the part of
the employer under the Wagner Act was hostile speech in the course of the
bargaining relationship. The amendments to section 8 added subsection
(c) which gave full protection to the expression of views short of "threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."' It still might be possible to
consider the speech of the employer in judging the question of good faith
under a "total atmosphere of the case" approach, but the section 8(c) free
speech protection would act as a limiting factor.
Employers' Duty
In a large measure the Board and the courts continued, after the Taft-
Hartley Act, to deal with cases involving management's alleged violations
of the good faith requirement as they had in the past. They applied the
same definition, used the same tools of statutory construction, and con-
tinued to insist that "each case must turn upon its particular facts.' '
Under the Wagner Act the Board was charged with the duty to protect
struggling new unionism and to see that it was the bargaining unit for
all the employees in a particular plant. But the amendments contained in
the Taft-Hartley Act brought on the "new approach" which put the em-
ployer on an equal plane to compete with the union for the loyalty of his
employees." Yet an examination of the cases involving the employer's good
faith bargaining does not reveal any clear shift by the courts and Board
in favor of the employer. An attempt by the company to make a deal
directly with the employees over the heads of the union was held improper.'
In the Otis case' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with
the Board that the company should have provided the union with time
study data in its possession. In a somewhat related situation under the
Wagner Act where the company refused to turn over its wage study to
the union but invited the union to make its own, it was held not to violate
the good faith requirement.'
While it was generally assumed in the early days of the Wagner Act
8070 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935).
"NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
'261 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
'Truitt Mfg. v. NLRB, 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
"Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAW 151 (4th ed. 1958).
"Order of Ry. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
TNLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953).
"Crompton-Highland Mills, 70 N.L.R.B. 206 (1946), enforcement denied, 167 F.2d 662
(5th Cir. 1948), rev'df and remanded, 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
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that an employer who refused to discuss a proposed wage increase because
of his professed inability to pay was not bargaining in good faith,' yet it
was not until 1955 in the Truitt case' that the United States Supreme Court
gave full support to this view. Those who had hoped for a sharp change
from the pro-employee bias of the old Board found no support in the good
faith cases. In this connection, in a rather pessimistic note, one of their
number concludes:' "While the Board and the courts frequently profess
they decide relevancy on a case by case basis, there is a presumption . . .
that the union's request, in itself, is a strong indication that the data sought
is germane to the issues. The burden of proof to the contrary rests on the
employer. "
A fair conclusion, therefore, is that rather than a change based on
policy considerations, the cases on employers' good faith bargaining under
the Taft-Hartley Act indicate a further development and clarification along
lines already established under the Wagner Act.
Since a detailed examination of the growth and clarification of the
good faith requirement under the Taft-Hartley Act is beyond the scope of
this paper, only one typical development will be considered here. Cases
involving the duty of management to furnish information indicate that the
Board's policy has not essentially changed. It is now settled through the
case decisions under the Taft-Hartley Act that it is an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to refuse to furnish the bargaining representative with
information concerning individual earnings, '1 job rates and classifications,"
merit increase," pension data," time study data,' incentive earnings and
the operations of the incentive system," and piece rates." Moreover, em-
ployers must assist the union even when the union has alternate sources for
obtaining the information." Management is likewise required to furnish
financial data when it claims inability to grant wage increases and other
benefits involving monetary outlays." The companies need not, however,
present the information solicited when it is not relevant to any bargainable
issue.'
Employees' Duty
As has already been pointed out, the good faith decisions prior to 1947
serve as "benchmarks and guideposts to establish the bargaining obligations
8GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 409, 410 (2d ed. 1958).
"oComment, 35 U. DEr. L.J. 499 (1958). The writer concludes that under the guise
of promoting good faith the courts and the Board are destroying the free enterprise
system on which it is based. Id. at 504.
"NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836, rehearing
denied, 350 U.S. 905 (1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 917 (1956).
"Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. N.L.R.B., 234 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1956).
"NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814
(1948)
"Phelps Dodge Cooper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
uSupra note 36.
"Dixie Mfg. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1950).
"Vanette Hosiery Mills v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1950).
"B. F. Goodrich Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1151 (1950).
"
9NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
"NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).
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of unions."' Armed with this new statutory grant of power, the Board
was empowered to hold labor to the same good faith requirements as capital.
This change also provided another weapon in the hands of the small local
employer under pressure from a powerful international union to enable
him to seek the help of the government under the claim of bad faith nego-
tiating. In the American Newspapers Publishing case1 the union had main-
tained a constant threat of strike to force the employer to disregard the
Board's ban on closed shops. During negotiations the union refused to
sign a contract of more than sixty days duration showing no justification
other than the illegal goal of a closed shop. The Board, affirmed by the
court, held this was in violation of the requirement to bargain in good faith.
Even though there is no abundance of cases on employees' disregard
for the established canons of good faith, there is a sufficient number to
show that the Board and the courts have followed the adage that "what
is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." The "illegal conditions"
cases are a good illustration. Under the Wagner Act if a company insisted
upon conditions giving individual contracts precedence over the contract
with the union' or refused to allow a union recognition clause," the Board
held that such action constituted bargaining in bad faith. Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, when the union insisted upon a prohibited hiring hall pro-
vision' or an outlawed closed shop union security clause, ' the same "illegal
condition" standard was applied to find the employees had violated their
good faith requirement.
While it is clear from the last cited case that if the union seeks an
"unlawful" objective, pari ratione, it will be held to be in violation of good
faith bargaining, the same cannot be said about the use of "unlawful"
means by the union to achieve a lawful goal. Since the Supreme Court had
said that recurrent and intermittent strikes were not within the scope of
"other concerted activities" protected by section 7 of the Act,' the Board
assumed that such activities were in violation of the employees' duty under
section 8 (d). An approach to this position by the Board was taken in the
Phelps-Dodge case' where it was found that the use of unprotected activity
such as "slow downs" were not in keeping with the good faith standard and
consequently relieved the employer of his corresponding duty. The issue
was met head on in the Personal Products case" where the Board found the
union had violated its obligation to bargain in good faith by initiating a
series of unprotected harassing tactics to exert pressure on the company
while negotiations were in progress. But the Court of Appeals reversed
"Leiter, The Meaning of Collective Bargaining, 6 LAB. L.J. 835 (1955).
'American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n. v. NLRB, 20 CCH Lab. Cas. - 60,691, 193
F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), aff'd. 345 U.S. 100 (1953).
Interstate S. S. Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1941).
'"National Motor Rebuilding Corp., 19 N.L.R.B. 503 (1940).
"National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950). The Board said this is a violation of the
good faith obligation because it evinces a mind closed and without purpose to find
a basis for agreement, an attitude which the Board and the courts have found to
be incompatible with good faith bargaining. Id., 78 N.L.R.B. at 981.
'Penello v. International Union, UMW, 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950).5 Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
Supra note 44.
"Matter of Textile Workers Union, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954).
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NOTES
the Board's decision, pointing out that engaging in "unprotected activity"
makes the employees liable for discharge by the company but this does not
furnish the basis for declaring that the union had not engaged in good
faith bargaining. ' The court said, "There is not the slightest inconsistency
between genuine desire to come to an agreement and the use of economic
pressure to get the kind of agreement one wants."'
This decision has been subjected to severe criticism.' It has been
pointed out that the dissent was correct in saying that the Board should be
able to take into account these union "tactics," together with all the other
relevent factors on the entire record, in order to determine whether there
has been a failure to bargain in good faith. Further, it was easy here to
conclude that the union was no longer attempting to bargain but rather
was substituting physical force for persuasive reasoning. The same writer
also argues that there cannot be the realistic communication between the
bargaining parties that one would ordinarily associate with good faith bar-
gaining when one party at the bargaining table threatens the other un-
fairly. He concludes that to equate a lawful economic strike with a series
of harassments is to seize upon a far-fetched basis to justify a reversal of
the Board's decision.8
A different conclusion was reached in another law review article" in
which the writer points up the failure of the Board to distinguish between
the Act's denying protection to certain activities of the union and its giving
the Board the power to forbid them. The latter is what the Board in ef-
fect would accomplish by determining that these "unprotected activities"
constituted a violation of sections 8(b) (3) and 8(d). In the absence of a
clear congressional mandate, the author concludes, the Board should not be
allowed to extend the scope of the meaning of good faith bargaining by
declaring that engaging in "unprotected activity" is evidence of the lack
of a sincere desire to reach an agreement. Further, the Board should not
expand the good faith requirement to require some sort of fair dealing
under 8(b) (3) which would be incompatible with any form of "unpro-
tected activity." Yet the Board has not been reconciled to this position
as is shown by its decision in the Boone County case, ' where it found the
union guilty of an unfair labor practice for engaging in an activity not
protected by section 7 when the union called a strike over a grievance that
should have been covered by the grievance clause in the bargaining agree-
ment.
Insofar as determining whether the good faith requirement has been ful-
filled, there should be room for a middle ground. It seems clear that in the
absence of specific legislation, to convert such a broad field of employee
activity as that not protected by section 7 into proof per se of bad faith
"Textile Workers Union v. NLRB (Personal Products case), 227 F.2d 409, 410
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956).
'I d., 227 F.2d at 410.
ORecent Decision, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 200 (1957).8Id. at 205.
"Comment, 71 HARV. L. REv. 502 (1957).
'International Union, UMW, 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957),
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is to incur the danger of by-passing the all-important subjective good faith
test. On the other hand, in order to use the "totality of conduct" test of
the Singer case,' the Board should be left free to scrutinize all the factors
that reveal the employees' intention during the negotiations and should
not be precluded from considering "unprotected activities" in making this
evaluation.
THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING "GOOD FAITH"
Arriving at a "Good Faith" Test
A consideration of the Boone County case' also raises the problem of
how to determine when the parties are bargaining in good faith. Early
critics of the NLRB decried the futility of trying to "legislate a state of
mind." The need to reach in some manner the subjective state of mind of
parties who are caught up in our legal processes is as old as our legal in-
stitutions themselves. Nevertheless the problem here takes on a peculiar
quality, for the solution must be tailored to fit the needs of an administra-
tive agency dealing with the rights and duties of industrial groups, rather
than the needs of a court of law judging the conduct of an individual. To
carry out its purpose the Board from the beginning had to find some way
to determine whether the employer was sincerely intent on reaching an
agreement or whether he was going through the motions of collective bar-
gaining for some ulterior purpose. Since states of mind, attitudes, and
intents are difficult to lay bare, the Board sought to reach its goal of de-
termining the employer's subjective intent in the light of what could be
reasonably inferred from a scrutiny of all the established facts. Though
their language differed somewhat, both the Board' and the courts" recog-
nized that they must endeavor to reach the subjective intent of the parties
and that this could be ascertained only by reference to all the relevant facts.
A further refinement known as the "negative test" was worked out
by Judge McGruder in the second Reed & Prince caseM when he defined
bad faith as the desire not to reach an agreement with the union and then
examined the evidence by asking whether a normal employer who was
willing to come to an agreement with the union would have followed the
same course of action. Since "general propositions do not decide concrete
cases,'"' this test has merit in that it helps to facilitate the courts' task of
applying the general to the particular.
The experience of the Board and the courts over the years in judging
the question of good faith has resulted in the establishment of certain indicia
of bad faith. In some situations the acts or omissions are only prima facie
evidence; in other cases they are conclusive proof of bad faith. The ten-
OSinger Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
' Supra note 65.6aGay Paree Undergarment Corp. (David I. Cohen), 91 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
'NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 1119 (1941).
70NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953). This case is discussed in Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,
71 HARv. L. REv. 1401, 1417 (1958).
"Mr. Justice Iolmes dissenting in Lochner v, New York, 198 U.S. 45,76 (1905).
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dency toward crystallization of the tests and away from the balancing of
intangible factors has become known as the "per se" approach. For ex-
ample, an employer's refusal to sign a written agreement has been held con-
clusive evidence of bad faith," and the employer's making unilateral changes
in position designed to reduce the strength of the employees' representative
seeking to bargain has been treated as at least prima facie evidence of bad
faith."3 However, in at least one case the Supreme Court has reversed the
Board's finding that particular employer conduct was per se an unfair
labor practice."
As Chamberlain in his work on collective bargaining"5 makes clear, it
was inevitable that the good faith decisions should concretize to some ex-
tent the criteria of good or bad faith and thus tend to accumluate a body
of "objective" standards for determining the question of good faith viola-
tion. But this "per se" approach is effective only in the case where there
has been an obvious violation. In the more difficult cases there is the
danger, inherent in the need of determining by external evidence the sub-
jective state of mind, of over simplifying the problem by substituting the
means (accepted per se criteria of bad faith) for the end (the true state
of mind of the alleged violator). Both the Board76 and the courts" have con-
tinued to be aware for the most part of the need to resist this temptation.
In so doing they have had the expressed approval of Congress as demon-
strated by the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. The House Bill
had provided for a series of objective standards that would determine
whether or not the parties had acted in good faith." This provision was
deleted from the Act in its final form, showing a congressional rejection of
the per se approach and at the same time an approval of the courts' and
Board's traditional method of searching for the parties' subjective intent
on a case-by-case basis."
The Freedom of the Bargainers and Their Good Faith Obligation
During debate on the Wagner Act in the Senate, one of its protagonists
categorically asserted that it does not compel anyone to make a compact
of any kind if no terms are arrived at that are satisfactory.' Since this
assurance was nowhere provided for in the Act, the job of reconciling the
freedom not to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the duty
to make a sincere effort to find a basis of agreement was dumped into the
lap of the Board and their judicial watchdogs, the courts. The difficulty
would have been avoided if there had been some insistence that the employer
,ust reac some ki ,,Of bargai.ig agreement with his emnloyees' repre-
sentatives, once they had been certified as a bargaining unit. But there
"NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632, 639 (4th Cir. 1940).
"aNLRB v. Stanislaus Implement Co., 226 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1955).
"'NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952). This case is discussed
again in the text accompanying note 84 infra.
75CHAMBERLAIN, CoLLECTIvE BARGAINING 301-03 (1st ed. 1951).7 Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950).
"Joy Silk Mills v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914
(1951).78H.R. Rmr. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947),
"Supra note 64, at 502.
OCox, supra note 70, at 1409.
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was no such insistence. The Board under the Wagner Act tended to re-
solve the conflict by imposing limitations on the employer's freedom in bar-
gaining activity. The Taft-Hartley Act sought to prevent this tendency by
spelling out in the statute that the parties were not obliged to come to an
agreement, and yet in the same section it reaffirmed the good faith re-
quirement with its demand of sincerely trying to reach an agreement,
thereby again leaving the Board to its own devices to work out a solu-
tion that would reconcile the contrasting concepts.'
Perhaps the new act at least made clear that the problem does not lend
itself to a simple solution by adding a line to the statute. Faced with this
problem Gregory has concluded that reconciling governmental pressure
on both sides to enter into an agreement with complete freedom from the
government as to the terms of the agreement is as bad as trying to serve
both God and mammon.
The Board and the Supreme Court piously reiterate that section
8(a)5 does not compel employers to agree to anything. But as a
practical matter, employers find it almost impossible to avoid com-
mitment to some extent over matters on which they are compelled
to bargain under the statute. The difference between this and a
direct statutory command from Congress that certain matters must
be included in contracts is only one of degree.'
Cox, in a more moderate tone, voices the same concern when he claims
that in attempting to insure the parties' abidance by the good faith obliga-
tion, "the law has crossed the threshold into the [bargaining] conference
room and now looks over the negotiator's shoulder. . . . [I]s the next step
to take a seat at the conference table?"' While Gregory sees no way to
reconcile the basic conflict, Cox indicates that the Board and the courts
are not moving in the right direction to find the solution.
It would be difficult, then, not to conclude that there is a considerable
body of expert opinion that feels the Board and the courts have untied
this gordian knot by cutting down oil the freedom of the employer not to
enter an agreement. But query whether this pessimism regarding the free-
dom of the bargaining parties is entirely borne out by the cases? An ex-
amination of some of the more important cases would indicate this con-
clusion is at least questionable.
In the American National Insurance case" the company insisted upon
a management clause which left in its hands the final responsibility for
promotions, discipline, and the scheduling of work with no. recourse to
arbitration on these matters. The Board held that this was a violation of
section 8(a) (5) of the amended Act because this insistence upon the final
say concerning terms and conditions of employment was tantamount to a
refusal to bargain on such matters. The Supreme Court reversed the
Board's holding, saying its view was needlessly technical since the com-
pany would not have been guilty of an unfair labor practice if, instead of
"See text accompanying notes 31, 32 supra.
"GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 413 (2d ed. 1958).
'Cox, supra note 70, at 1403.
"NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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proposing a clause that removed some matters from arbitration, it had sim-
ply refused in good faith to agree to the union's proposals for limited
arbitration.' The court also stated that it is not for the Board to pass
on the substantive terms of the bargaining agreement. If the employer
can use his bargaining strength and skill to get an extremely favorable
contract (or visa versa for the employees), this should not be interfered
with by the Board. The court took a different view, however, in finding
against the employer in the Majwre case" where the company did not make
any positive proposals regarding a management clause in their favor, but
instead flatly refused to sign an agreement unless management was given
the right unilaterally to control each and every feature of wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment. Taken together the two cases reveal
the courts' continuing effort to strike a reasonable balance between the
often conflicting goals of good faith bargaining and freedom to bargain
without unduly sacrificing either goal.
In a recent case,' one of the grounds on which the Board had found
the company guilty of failing to bargain in good faith was its insistence
on provisions in the bargaining agreement which gave the union little, if
any, real voice in important aspects of employment relations. But in re-
fusing to go along with the Board on this ground the Fifth Circuit said
the fact that the employer insisted upon a contract which left the employees
in substantially no better state than they were in without it, is not a failure
to bargain in good faith.' One might well agree with an analysis of the
case which stated that there was good precedent for finding a lack of good
faith by management in view of the company's record as a whole, particular-
ly since it failed to give any reason why such a contract was necessary.'
However, the case is cited here because it reveals the court bending over
backward to leave management free in the exercise of its bargaining power;
hence it lends strong support to the American National Insurance case' in
casting some doubt on the thesis that the courts are committed to a policy
of passing on the substantial term of the bargaining agreement and of con-
tinuously encroaching on the freedom of the bargainers. Perhaps even the
"experts" are guilty here of a somewhat exaggerated generalization.
THE VALIDITY OF THE GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT
An examination of some of the critical writings on the subject of the
good faith requirement bears out Holmes' dictum that "when you realize
that you are dealing with a matter of degree you must realize that reason-
"See GRmoRY, op. cit. supra note 82. He admits that this case does check his
sweeping charge of the loss of management prerogatives in the name of good faith
bargaining, but he summarily dismisses the case as being unsound as an "open
sesame" for management clauses that would deliver all the control of bargaining
into the company's hand as though the Majure case, note 86 infra, didn't exist,
and the limiting of each case to its particular facts were not an operating principle!
'Majure v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952).
' White's Uvalde Mines v. NLRB, 117 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1957), rev'd, 255 F.2d 564 (5th
Cir. 1958).
'8The court agreed with the Board that the company, by making threats and promises
to the employees and by instituting several unilateral wage increases without
consulting the union, had violated 8(a) (1). Id., 255 F.2d at 566.
"Recent Decision, 34 NoTRE DAME LAW. 125 (1958).
OSupra note 84.
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able men may differ widely as to the place where the line should fall. '"'
The phrase "differ widely" reaches its most extreme illustration in the
writings of Professor Sylvester Petro who would solve the various complex
problems that collective bargaining entails by the simple expedient of re-
quiring only that the employer listen to everything that the union nego-
tiators have to say and be able to reply to every suggestion or proposal
with an unqualified "No." For him the great enemy that seeks to thwart
this simple solution of the problems is the use of political pressure which
works its way into the collective bargaining picture under the disguise of
the "good faith requirement."" He takes the position that the good faith
doctrine was conjured up by a bureaucratic board aided and abetted by
some of the courts in an effort to have the terms of the bargaining agree-
ment determined by law instead of by natural economic forces. Apparent-
ly the clearer minds-the Supreme Court in its better moments, and the
people as a whole-have never approved of this type of federal interfer-
ence in private business.' In view of the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the frequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the
past twenty years, and the writings of the various interested groups in our
society, " it is hard to believe that Petro's book was not written in 1937 in-
stead of 1957. The best that can be said of that writer's commentary on
good faith bargaining is that it is part of the over-all theme of the book-
government intervention should not be part of the labor policy of a free
society. Until he enlightens the reader on how to turn back the clock,
there is the distinct possibility that Professor Petro's reflections on this
particular problem will continue to receive no serious attention.
Gregory sees the good faith requirement as a useful tool that has served
its purpose and should now be discarded. It was useful to the Board in
the days of the Wagner Act in fulfilling its task of helping to put in-
cipient unionism on its feet. But now, except in certain areas in the south,
unions no longer need artificial assistance from the government to com-
mand respect and to have their requests taken seriously. He therefore con-
cludes :'
A far more healthy bargaining climate would prevail in this coun-
try if section 8(a) (5) were stricken from the NLRA and the con-
tent of collective agreements were left to be worked out by direct
dealings between employers and unions. Such a step would no
doubt check the organization of employees and union success in
parts of the south. But it is quite possible that the ingenuity of
Congress could invent some special procedure to protect the in-
terests of newly-formed local unions ...
This conclusion is questionable. It has already been noted that the
case histories in this field will not bear out the unqualified contention that
"Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
'2PETRo, THE LABOR POLICY OF A FREE Socrry 214-17, 254-56 (1957).
Old. at 216.
"Not even the National Association of Manufacturers could be cited in support of
this contention of Petro's as evidenced by their endorsement of the good faith re-
quirement at page 28 of their booklet INDUSTRY BEiEVEs.
"GREoRY, op. cit. supra note 82, at 414.
"See text accompanying notes 84 and 87 supra.
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the bargaining parties are no longer substantially free to work out the
terms of the agreement. It is not realistic to bolster this conclusion by
playing down the needs of union organization in our social structure.
Unionism is an institution our free society has developed to meet the needs
of the laboring classes to achieve social justice. With the increase of tech-
nical know-how and automation, the number of "white collar" workers is
likely in the near future to far outnumber the "blue collar" workers. Con-
sequently the problem of giving these office workers a representative place
in our industrial democracy can scarcely be limited to a few areas in the
south. Finally, would it be wise for Congress to abandon a workable tool
just to test the ingenuity of its members? At best it seems somewhat dis-
ingenuous to expect some "procedural invention" of Congress to fill the
vacancy left after throwing out the baby with the bath. Gregory's con-
clusion takes no cognizance of the role of the good faith clause in enabling
the government to exact a standard of conduct in the process of negotiat-
ing the bargaining agreement, and it offers no substitute for controlling
the activities of the industrial giants of both capital and labor in the in-
terest of the common good, save by the discredited technique of trial by
combat.
In sharp contrast to the "good faith must go" school of thought is
the position taken by Mary Dooley in the Labor Law Journal.' Although
she is concerned there with the obligation of the employee only, the general
tenor of her article is susceptible to broader implications. Her viewpoint
is based on her findings of steady progress by the Board, first in its job of
applying the statutory standard of good faith bargaining to the latest de-
velopments which challenge the role of government in industrial relations,
and second in the overwhelming concurrence of the courts' conclusions
with those of the Board. Typical of her findings on the first point are
those in the area of determining what kind of activity is allowed the em-
ployees during the negotiations. Instead of inconsistency and radical
change,' she finds that "the Board and the Courts are gradually siphoning
the unprotected types of conduct from the unprotected illegal activities'
according to a practical case by case pattern. On the second point she
says: " [I]n considering charges of inconsistency and irrelevance of Board
decisions to the facts of industrial life, the evidence shows that 90% of
the Board's decisions have been approved by the courts on appeal.'
Obviously undaunted by the oft-voiced fears of government intrusion in
this field, she regards the Board's role of positive intervention in the
collective bargaining process as something to be determined by the test of
workability.
The value of the Dooley analysis is that it steers clear of theoretical
speculation and sweeping generalizations and attempts to see no further
than the sum total of the cases at hand. She seems keenly aware that here
too an ounce of history is worth a pound of logic. Looking back on the
'Dooley, Union's Duty to Bargain Collectively with the Employer, 8 LABOR L.J. 249
(1957).
"See text accompanying notes 62 and 61 8upra.
'Dooley, supra note 97, at 255.
'"Ibid.
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history of the NLRB cases, it would have been difficult to predict the future
course of the development of law and at the same time it is difficult to deny
that it has undergone a fairly consistent development. It is perhaps as
Chamberlain says when he reasons that since the "relationship between in-
dividuals and groups within society undergo change . . . at times in this
process of change perhaps nothing but expedient solutions may appear pos-
sible. ' '
Realizing that one cannot encompass within a short article all of the
issues involved in a given subject, it is still rather surprising that Miss
)ooley failed even to intimate that "workability" was not the sole test
which would determine whether or not the Board would be given the "role
of.positive intervention in the collective bargaining process."' Few would
question the role of the Board in setting up standards of conduct within
which the bargaining parties must operate since it is the duty of the Board
to apply a statute that seeks to effectuate a national policy aimed at foster-
ing industrial peace. But it is quite another thing to give this same agency
the added power of assisting in formulating the agreement itself, particular-
ly when the statute expressly states that the parties shall be free not to
reach an agreement. It is submitted that the immediate test is whether
Congress would amend the act to grant the Board this power, and that
since this seems unlikely, there is even less likelihood that the courts would
approve of such a step in the absence of statutory change.
The recent Borg-Warner decision' by the Supreme Court involved the
question of whether an employer had bargained in good faith when he re-
fused to sign a contract without a clause requiring a secret ballot among
all the employees (union and nonunion) on whether to accept the com-
pany's last offer before a strike should be called. The majority of the Court
agreed with the Board that this was a violation of good faith bargaining by
the company, since this provision contravened a basic policy of the Act by
weakening the independence of the employees' representative. However,
even though there was sufficient precedent to hold with the majority and
limit the case to its particular facts, the Court split 5-4. In a strong dissent
the minority expressed the fear that the decision may open the door to an
intrusion by the NLRB into the substantive aspects of bargaining which go
beyond anything contemplated by the Act or suggested in prior decisions
of the Court.' In the decision of the Board' there was also a sharp dis-
sent on this same issue by former Board chairman Farmer and present
chairman Leedom. They questioned the propriety of attempting to deter-
mine what type of bargaining demands may be insisted upon to the point
of impasse.' This strong opposition at both Board and Supreme Court
levels to even an indirect attempt to pass on the substantive terms of the
contract, taken together with the decision in the White case,' hardly sup-
0' 1CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 485 (1st ed. 1951).
'
02Dooley, supra note 97, at 286.
'
0 NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958).
'Comment, 11 STAN. L. REV. 188 (1959), criticizes the decision.
1w42 LAB. REL. REP. Analysis 5 (1958).
'Id. at Analysis 1.
"Supra note 87.
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ports the conclusion that the Board, with the Court's blessing, is ready to
assume a positive role of direct intervention in the bargaining process.
No appraisal of the value of the good faith requirement should over-
look a leading article in the June, 1958, issue of the Harvard Law Review
by Professor Cox.' It is a thorough, up-to-date critique of the whole prob-
lem of good faith bargaining and is by one of the recognized authorities in
the labor law field. The author assumes both the value and the continuance
of the good faith requirement. But he is concerned that the subjective test,
as a result of recent judicial and administrative decisions, is in danger of
being replaced by some kind of objective standard of good faith bargaining
practice which would lead to government regulation of the processes of col-
lective bargaining. He makes effective use of the Truitt case' to demon-
strate that the Board, with the Supreme Court's approval, has "undertaken
to regulate the manner in which collective bargaining is conducted regard-
less of the actor's state of mind."'°
The Board in the Truitt case decided that it was a matter of "settled
law" that failure to substantiate a claim of inability to pay increased wages
by withholding information is a failure to bargain in good faith. The
Supreme Court approved without making any attempt to determine wheth-
er, in view of all the pertinent facts of the case, the employer neverthless
might have had a sincere desire to enter into an agreement with the union.
In support of his decision, Justice Black cited the Pioneer Pearl Button Co.
case,' which in Cox's opinion "does not remotely suggest that such proof
standing alone would be enough to support a finding of bad faith."'
The net result of this per se approach, in Cox's view, is to interpret
the statute to impose an obligation to conform to good bargaining practices,
"which necessarily means any practice which the NLRB or courts deem
requisite in the light of such standards as they can derive from the writ-
ings of 'experts' " instead of following the wiser, traditional approach of
requiring "only bona fide recognition coupled with some kind of dis-
cussion looking towards an agreement, thus leaving bargaining practices to
voluntary improvement as the relationship between a company and a union
matures. "'
Professor Cox, himself, suggests a possible explanation why one might
reserve judgment on some of his conclusions when he observes that it is
too soon to decide that the Supreme Court is committed to the rationale
of the Truitt case, and that its decision is limited to its own particular fac-
tual situation." It already has been indicated" that there are ample
grounds upon which to conclude that not only is the Supreme Court. not
committed but neither is the Board necessarily committed to a policy of
'Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401 (1958).
'Truitt Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
'Cox, supra. note 108, at 1430. This same point was made more succinctly by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in his partial dissent in the Truitt case.
1l N.L.R.B. 837 (1936).
.. Cox, supra note 108, at 1433.
'id. at 1435.
'Ibid. The author curiously labels this limiting language by the Court as an "avenue
of retreat."
"'See text accompanying note 89 supra.
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governmental regulation of the collective bargaining agreement. Further-
more, while the academician can indulge in the luxury of weighing the im-
plications of a particular case for long-range public labor policy, the court
has to come up with a decision on the concrete problem brought before it.
The need to restrict its horizon is especially acute when dealing with a
statutory standard such as good faith, which can have meaning only in its
application to a particular set of facts in a particular case. Even at this
level, at least one analyst' 6 felt that the Court was ruling out the per se
approach in the Truitt case when it cautioned that this decision did not
mean that in every case where economic inability is raised as an argument
against increased wages it automatically follows that the employees are en-
titled to substantiating evidence.
Even if one takes a pure policy approach to Cox's conclusion, there is
reason not to concur. He concedes that the Truitt case exemplifies one of
the ways in which the law grows-that which has been strong evidence for
a time of subjective bad faith comes to be sufficient proof standing alone -
but he intimates that its justification is dependent upon a conscious ex-
amination of the underlying questions of policy and this justification is lack-
ing here.117 This reasoning is at least puzzling. As a matter of policy the
union should have adequate information on the statutory subjects of col-
lective bargaining so there can be a meeting of minds at the bargaining
table. It is a matter of record that the employer usually controls this in-
formation and has often in the past used it to thwart reaching an agree-
ment. After the Truitt case, the Court served notice on management that
it best think twice before withholding necessary information. At the same
time the Court is in a position to say that under the circumstances presented
in another case, the withholding may not have been in bad faith. To some
degree, at least, the same reasoning can be applied to the Personal Products
and Boone County cases (the second and third in the trinity of cases main-
ly relied on here by Professor Cox).'
In the interest of creating an atmosphere conducive to a sincere and
honest attempt to reach an agreement, the Board, in making a statutory in-
terpretation regarding the union's actions, which frequently in the past
have been associated with the subjective intent not to reach an agreement,
ruled that such activities may stand alone as proof of bad faith. This is
just what the Board has done in the past regarding employers' actions,
e.g., written agreements and unilateral changes, even though there was no
mention of these things in the statute. Hence the Board's view should
offer no problem for the union acting in good faith, but rather serve only
to exert pressure on the laggards. Besides, the trial examiner and the Board
are often a little closer to the realities of the industrial competition between
capital and labor than the detached theorist, and therefore more apt to
know the point where theory must be tempered by practical expediency.
As a matter of practical necessity, they are often forced to create this kind
of presumption to facilitate their task of applying the law effectively,
"
1Jenkins, The Supreme Court and the N.L.R.B., 9 LAB. L.J. 425 (1958).
"Cox, supra note 108, at 1433.
"sid. at 1424.
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leaving it to the courts and ultimately to the legislature to operate as a
check on their decisions.
A further basis of dissent from the Cox position follows from a read-
ing of his historical resum6. T'he reader justifiably wonders how the Board
and the courts have managed to avoid until the present the per se peril,
with its seemingly inevitable result of government regulation of collective
bargaining, because he writes that as early as 1945 both the Board and the
courts had indicated in the May case, that unilateral action by the bar-
gaining employer is an unfair labor practice per se.' Would not the same
deductions that are made by that author from the Truitt case, be applicable
to the May case, other things being equal, so that the subjective test for
good faith should have been on its way out (with all the attendant dire con-
sequences) some time ago? Or is there some undisclosed reason to think
that the administrative and judicial bodies are less flexible now than they
were in the middle forties? If there is not, it is reasonable to conclude that
the Board and courts are not now radically departing from their customary
approach to the problems of good faith bargaining.
Implicit in Cox's whole treatment of the good faith question is the
idea that maturity in bargaining relations can be achieved only to the de-
gree that the Board and the courts exercise a minimum role in the formu-
lation of. the bargaining agreement. Ideally of course, the mature collec-
tive bargaining relationship can be achieved primarily by the two parties
involved. But as a practical matter there is often need for a third party
with power to create and preserve the minimum conditions under which fair
and honest negotiations can be carried on. Reluctantly, but necessarily,
the government has been required to be this third party. For example, the
Wagner Act theoretically required only that the Board see to it that man-
agement and labor got together and from this it was expected that there
would follow a mature relationship without any further action on the
agency's part. The origin, growth and development of the good faith
doctrine up to 1947 clearly demonstrates that mature bargaining was found
to go hand in hand with enforcement of a statutory standard of bargaining
conduct.
What about the past thirteen years? Have we now reached that high
plateau of mutual understanding and trust between employer and employee
wherein bargaining as a "brute contest of economic power" has been re-
placed by "reason, a sense of responsiveness to government and public
opinion, and moral principle," so that the Board can afford to play'a less
vigorous role in working out and applying the basic rules which insure
fair play from both sides in arriving at a collective bargaining agreement ?
An affirmative answer would have to be based on proof that de facto there
has been a decided improvement in labor-management relations in the past
few years. According to one experienced researcher in the labor relatiois
'May Dep't. Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
'Cox, supra note 108, at 1409.
NOTES19601
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 21 [1959], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol21/iss2/9
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
field, quite the contrary is true.12' The situation has steadily deteriorated
in the past decade and the hardening of the lines of opposition reaches its
peak at the bargaining table where every word is carefully measured so that
all openings for a friendly give and take are rigorously excluded. The
writer goes on to advocate the development of various common interest
projects between labor and management in an effort to build up mutual
understanding and confidence so that the fruits of these efforts will be real-
ized in the bargaining process.
The pertinency of this information to the good faith obligation is ob-
vious. The Board, since it must deal in the present, cannot afford to be
guided by the hoped-for future. It must proceed pragmatically from case
to case, measuring its exercise of statutory power according to the need
presented by the particular facts of each case. It must allow the bargaining
parties full freedom to negotiate their own agreement, but within the limits
of the standards that have been arrived at through the combined efforts of
Congress, the Board and the courts, in order to preserve this freedom for
both management and labor. Time has shown that it would have been rash
in the past to have predicted that the Board and the courts would fail to
accomplish this objective, once there has been a review of their record as a
whole. This should serve as a caveat to one who attempts to judge the fu-
ture. After all the evidence is in, it might well call for the same verdict.
This questioning of Cox's basic premise and some of his general ob-
servations is intended to be only a partial dissent. Professor Cox's desire
to maintain the subjective good faith test and his concern about its possible
abandonment or diminution should be heartly endorsed. The good faith re-
quirement was born of the need to hold up a standard of conduct so that
justice might be served in the process of collective bargaining. As part of
the natural evolution, there developed certain "rules of law" to serve as
guides in deciding future cases. But because the law is not a dry collec-
tion of regulations but a living body of principles, the good faith doctrine
must continue to grow; and this growth is contingent upon a continual em-
ployment of a test that is neither static nor arbitrary to determine whether
the good faith requirement has been met. The so-called objective test fails
on both counts. It would permit the duty to bargain in good faith to
crystallize into a set of rigid rules. This would be inadequate to meet the
diversified industrial problems arising from the American industrial scene.
It would also be an open invitation to the unscrupulous employer or union
to defeat its purpose of establishing a just result by living according to the
letter but not the spirit of the regulation.' Then, too, the per se approach
is an easy prey to arbitrariness. The formulation of rules would be in the
'-Sidney Hillman Address by Goldberg, The State of Labor-Management Relations,
1958-1959, Uniy. of Wis., Nov. 5, 1958. This same hardening of relations at the
bargaining table in states where there are "Right to Work" laws is noted by
MEYER, RIGHT TO WORK IN PRACTICE (Report to the Fund for the Republic) 41
(1959).
'The subjective test has the advantage of exacting a beneficial coercive effect by
its element of uncertainty-akin to Mr. Justice Holmes' thought that "the law is
full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly some matter
of degree." Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
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NOTES
1) ands of the specialist, and thus the problem of the limitations of "rule by
expert" would reappear.'
In conclusion, it is submitted that the good faith requirement deter-
mined by the subjective test can continue to play a role in the development
of our industrial democracy that parallels the role the due process require-
ment has played in our political democracy. For this reason (as well as
other reasons already outlined) its continuation thus formulated is neces-
sary to the achievement of industrial peace based upon justice. In the
hands of the Supreme Court, the due process clause has been a yardstick
to measure both federal and state action to determine if there has been a
violation of "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all of our civil and political institutions.""'
Although the "flow of decisions" on due process has established a body
of settled law, it constantly remains open to allow the courts to solve new
situations not embraced in previous decisions." To the end that decency
and fair play be served in the drafting of the collective bargaining agree-
ment-an objective of tremendous significance since it serves as a law
within the law to regulate the daily lives of millions of men and women in
industry- the good faith requirement has built up a substantial body of
established precedent. But it cannot be chained to the past. It should be
geared to the realities of the present. The good faith requirement must,
like the due process requisite, remain flexible so that it will continue to be
an effective instrument in the service of industry and the common good
by continuing to hold management and labor to a standard higher than
self interest.'
REV. EMMETT P. O'NEILL
'Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
'Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
'"See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
'
2 On February 23, 1960, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union,
80 Sup. Ct. 419 (1960), ruled that the use of unorthodox forms of economic
pressure by a union to enforce its bargaining demands In contract negotiations does
not, of itself, amount to a refusal to bargain in good faith. This is evidence of the
Court's refusal to label arbitrarily particular action as inconsistent with the duty
to bargain in good faith.
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